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The purpose of this study is to investigate the impacts of a natural disaster on a developing 
country’s economy. In that sense, we look at the impact of August 1999 earthquake in Turkey 
on two important macroeconomic indicators of the Turkish economy (Real Output and 
Employment) with recovery policies followed by the government and international donors. Our 
results indicate that the earthquake had a significant immediate negative impact on both 
output and employment growth in Turkey.  While output growth reverted back to its pre-
disaster pattern after the initial shock, employment growth did not recover.  The earthquake 
had both a short run and long run influence on the Turkish economy. This study will develop 
understanding of the possible effects of future earthquakes. Also, it will help the Turkish 
Government evaluate already-applied mitigation measures (like Turkish Catastrophe 
Insurance Pool etc.) and guide the preparation for forthcoming disasters since scientists have 
reached a consensus that a major earthquake is expected in Istanbul.   
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When it comes to the assertion that the costs associated with natural 
disasters have risen dramatically in the past fifty years, there are no dissenters.  
“During the past decade, the economic costs of rainstorms, floods, earthquakes, 
volcanoes, droughts, and other extreme events have increased about 14-fold from 
the decade of the 1950s” (Munich Re, 2001).   The growing magnitude of economic 
losses goes hand-in-hand with technological development and urbanization.  Lists 
of major disasters appear to be dominated by those that occurred in highly 
developed countries such as Japan and the United States with economic loss 
estimates in the tens of billions of dollars.  However, the effect of natural disasters 
on less developed countries can be far more dramatic in relative terms.  Andersen 
(2002) reports the economic losses due to catastrophe for 38 less developed 
countries over the time period 1990-2000.  For some small countries, the loss 
ranged as high as 15% of GDP with a mean loss of 2.13% of GDP for the group.    In 
the same way that poor people are more vulnerable to natural disasters, less 
developed countries are more vulnerable than highly developed countries.  
Managing hazard risk becomes more challenging for the developing countries since 
they are less able to absorb the losses.  For the period 1990-2000, whereas roughly 
half of the losses were covered by formal insurance contracts in industrialized 
countries, only 5% of reported damages were covered in developing countries 
(Andersen, 2002). In the absence of standard risk management instruments such 
as insurance, developing countries must rely on international emergency support or 
are forced to divert funds from existing development programs to fund temporary 
disaster relief efforts (Andersen, 2002).     
As a result of this negative effect of disaster loss on the economy of the 
developing countries, it becomes crucial for them to (1) mitigate the possible loss 
from the future disasters (2) be prepared for the possible losses (3) have appropriate 
  2budget planning for post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction as “risk 
management strategies” (Freeman and Kunreuther, 2002).  In formulating risk 
management strategies, the first step should be to clarify the impacts of previous 
natural disasters on the developing country’s economy.  In addition, by 
investigating the trend of economic indicators pre- and post-disaster, we can 
address the question of whether the financial support provided by international 
funds does affect that country’s economic situation and expectations.  In Bender 
(1991), the Organization of American States (OAS) noted, “funds intended for 
development are diverted into costly relief efforts. These indirect but profound 
economic effects and their drain on the limited funds now available for new 
investment compound the tragedy of a disaster in a developing country.” 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impacts of a natural disaster 
on a developing country’s economy. In that sense, we look at the impact of the 
August 1999 earthquake in Izmit, Turkey on two important macroeconomic 
indicators of the Turkish economy (Real Output and Employment) with recovery 
policies followed by the government and international donors.   In terms of lives 
lost, the 1999 earthquake in Izmit is listed among worst ever natural disasters 
(Reuters, 2004).  However, the effect of the earthquake cannot be measured solely 
in terms of lives lost but also in its impact on those that survived and their quality 
of life following the event.  A study of Turkish macroeconomic indicators allows us 
to glimpse the effect on the survivors and their recovery.  In so doing, this study will 
develop better understanding of the effects of future earthquakes.  Preparation for 
forthcoming disasters is very important since scientists have reached a consensus 
that a major earthquake is expected in Istanbul (Parsons et al, 2000).  In addition, 
it will help the Turkish Government evaluate already-applied mitigation measures 
(eg. Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool).   
  3Most previous studies of the impact of the 1999 earthquake on the Turkish 
economy were based on initial assessments done by institutions like the World 
Bank and State Planning Organization of Turkey (SPO).   Selcuk and Yeldan (2001) 
provided the first empirical attempt to investigate the macroeconomic impact of the 
earthquake using a general equilibrium model to simulate the economy under four 
possible government recovery policies and levels of international support.  The data 
were drawn from Kose and Yeldan (1996) and input-output table of Turkey (State 
Institute of Statistics, 1994). The results were based on four cases: (1) no policy 
change, (2) discretionary adjustments on indirect tax rates, (3) with flexible indirect 
tax adjustments, and (4) with foreign aid. They concluded that the initial impact of 
the earthquake on the value of GDP may range from -4.5% to 0.8%. Based on their 
measurements of expected consumer welfare, Selcuk and Yeldan recommend a 
policy of subsidies to individual sectors financed by international donors.  Further, 
they find that an indirect tax generates further losses in output. 
Other studies have concentrated on earthquake risk mitigation measures, 
including earthquake insurance policies in Turkey (Gulkan, 2002; Freeman and 
Kunreuther, 2002).  In addition to an already existing required insurance called 
Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP) these studies suggest supplementary 
mitigation measures that reduce the risk to new buildings as well as retrofitting to 
mitigate risk to existing structures.  
In sum, the negative impact of the earthquake on the Turkish economy is 
estimated intuitively and with the assumption of “no policy change” by the World 
Bank and SPO, and using theory-driven simulation methods. However, the degree 
of the impact after the earthquake has not been analyzed with real data. This study 
represents an initial attempt to address the question, “What happened to the 
Turkish economy in general pre and post earthquake with already existing recovery 
policies and mitigation measures?”  
  4The rest of the paper follows with recent history of Turkey’s experience with 
earthquakes, initial assessments of the August 1999 earthquake, available recovery 
policies and mitigation measures, statistical analysis of the impact, and finally 
conclusions. 
II. RECENT HISTORY OF TURKEY’S EXPERIENCE WITH EARTHQUAKES 
Turkey is geographically located at one of the most earthquake-prone areas 
of the world.  A brief summary of recent urban earthquakes that have occurred in 
Turkey is presented in Table 1. According to Gulkan (2001) approximately 20,000 
people have died in five urban earthquakes in Turkey during the past 10 years. As a 
result of these earthquakes, 70,000 buildings were damaged and 20,000 buildings 
were destroyed.  The cost of the damage assigned only to the buildings that were 
destroyed is US$20 billion. Gulkan claims that the type of the construction of the 
multi-story apartments in Turkey is a very important factor and has exacerbated 
the losses. 
17 August 1999 an earthquake that centered near Izmit was the most 
terrifying disaster in recent Turkish history.  The earthquake had a moment 
magnitude of 7.4 in Richter measurement.  The impact of the earthquake on the 
population and the economy was mainly felt in seven cities in the Marmara Region 
(Kocaeli, Sakarya, Yalova, İstanbul, Bolu, Bursa, and Eskisehir). The death toll was 
18,373 with injuries to another 48,901 people.  Reportedly 93,000 housing units 
and 15,000 small business units collapsed or were badly damaged. Another 
220,000 housing units and 21,000 small business units sustained damage to a 
lesser degree (Erdik and Durukal, 2003).  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 1 (Gurkan, 2002) 
  
 
  5III.INITIAL ASSESSMENT ON THE IMPACT OF THE EARTHQUAKE ON 
TURKISH ECONOMY1
The Marmara Region, where the major impact of the earthquake occurred, is 
very important to the Turkish Economy both in terms of production and 
consumption capacities. This area accounts for 23% of the total population of 
Turkey. The seven cities Kocaeli, Sakarya, Yalova, İstanbul, Bolu, Bursa, and 
Eskisehir represent 34.7 % of Turkish GNP, further these cities produce 46.7% of 
total industry value added. The Marmara Region, mainly Kocaeli, Sakarya, and 
Yalova is the center for the Turkish oil, raw material for textile, automobile, 
petrochemical, and tire industries.  
With an average income level per person that far exceeds the national 
average, the region also plays a very important role in terms of domestic 
consumption demand. According to published reports (RMS, 1999), the negative 
impact of the earthquake on capital accumulation and national product was 
declared to be approximately US$9-13 billion and the total estimated insured loss 
was US$1.5-3.5 billion.  Johnson (2000) reports that direct damage generated 70% 
of the total insured losses while business interruption accounted for the remaining 
30%.  
Impact of the Earthquake on Government Budget 
The negative impacts of the earthquake on the Turkish government’s budget 
can be summarized in three points: (1) The cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction 
of public buildings damaged by the earthquake (2) The postponed taxes that should 
have been paid by the earthquake victims and (3) The increase in unemployment 
compensation. Under these circumstances, the negative effect of the earthquake on 
the government’s budget is estimated to be approximately US$6.2 billion of which 
US$3.5 billion went to build housing units or reconstruct the damaged ones for 
                                                 
1 Most of this section is based on the initial assessments by the State Planning Organization 
of Turkey, 2001  (http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/deprem/). 
  6either temporary or permanent accommodations.  The government decided not to 
collect principal and the interest for 3 years from people with loans from the state 
bank. In addition, low interest loans were offered to assist with the rebuilding effort.  
The Impact of the Earthquake on Industry 
The main heavy industry of Turkey is located in the Marmara Region for 
example, “automobile manufacturing, petrochemicals, motor and railway vehicle 
manufacture and repair, basic metal works, tire manufacturing, textile, sugar 
processing, paper mills, power plants and tourism” (Erdik and Durukal, 2003).  
Most of the roads, railways, pipelines, transmission lines, and energy distribution, 
communication channels were badly damaged and the cost of reconstruction is 
estimated to be US$200 million in the short-run and US$400 million in the long-
run. 
As a result of these, the estimated loss in the value added in the manufacturing 
industry was US$600 to 700 million and growth rate of the manufacturing industry 
was expected to decline by 1.6 points. The loss in production and sales is estimated 
to be approximately US$222.1 million in total for manufacturing, most of which are 
based on oil, coal, and gas production. Although there was no significant direct 
damage to the agricultural sector, public institutions (like Forestry Ministry, State 
Water Administration) that are directly involved in agricultural activities 
experienced a loss of around US$870 billion due to earthquake damage. 
For medium and small enterprises, the cost is estimated to be in the range of 
US$1.1 and US$2.6 billion based on the World Bank report (1999).  For the 
insurance sector with 41 insurance companies, the total industry reserves seemed 
adequate to cover domestic losses before the earthquake. However, the industry 
capacity was incapable of covering the losses from the earthquake (roughly 95% of 
the total losses were covered by international insurers).  By September 1999, only 
8,500 earthquake-related claims were submitted.  “The most significant impact on 
  7the insurance sector will be in the form of lost revenues due to increased premiums 
for Turkey and ……. since most policy coverage is paid by foreign insurance 
companies, the timing of the payments of claims to the beneficiaries depend upon 
the funding capacity of foreign insurers. ” (World Bank, 1999) 
In the case of the banking sector, the negative impacts can be summarized as: 
1.  Further worsening of the performance of loan portfolios of the commercial 
banks. 
2.  Difficulty of the financial status of state banks because of the increased 
maturity mismatch and liquidity squeeze due to the deference of the 
existing loans up to 3 years, providing interest rate subsidies.  
3.  Increased risk of default. 
When we look at the cost of earthquake damage on social sectors like 
education, health, environment, and employment, the magnitude of the negative 
impact of natural disasters on a country’s economy becomes more obvious but 
harder to quantify. In the Marmara Region, 43 schools collapsed and 377 schools 
were badly damaged. The total damage cost to school facilities is estimated to be 
US$107 million in rehabilitation. The reconstruction cost of hospitals is estimated 
totaling US$19 million. 
The cost of the earthquake on industries can be summarized as: (1) business 
interruption, (2) loss of labor supply (3) reduction in capital (due to damaged 
buildings, machines, stocks, etc.), (4) reduction in production and sales when 
factories had to shut down temporarily, (5) psychological distress, (6) a reduction in 
tax revenue (7) an increase in unemployment compensation. 
 
Risk Management in Turkey  
The tremendous loss from the August 1999 earthquake forced the Turkish 
government to seek out and apply risk management strategies.  The risk 
  8management program has followed five main courses of action.  First, research on 
monitoring and forecasting the earthquake risk in the area of earthquake 
engineering has been expanded. Second, with the help of many research centers 
specified on earthquake and media, public awareness about the risk was 
propagated. Third, distributing the international donations to proper sectors/places 
where needed most has been coordinated.  Fourth, Indirect taxation has been 
implemented by the government. Lastly, in terms of market instruments, risk 
(monetary loss) of earthquake is being transferred by an obligatory government 
insurance policy called the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP).   
The first two actions are beyond the scope of this study. As for international 
funding, according to the World Bank report (1999), US$3 billion is identified to be 
as “exceptional external financing”.  In order to compensate the earthquake costs, 
US$2.5 billion has come from international foundations. “Claims paying capacity of 
TCIP for year 2002 is approximately US$1 billion including reinsurance (US$840 
million), premium reserves and the credit obtained from the World Bank” (Gulkan, 
2002). Most arrangements for distributing these funds are made by the Treasury 
Department of Turkey.  
Indirect taxation to increase the rehabilitation budget was unique in many 
ways. The Turkish military authorities allowed male citizens that have not 
completed their military obligation to do their service for 28 days (instead of 8-18 
months). The only requirement to gain this right is to be willing to pay 15,000 Mark 
(US$2000 in year 2000 when this law was applied) to the government (SPO Report, 
2001).    
The Turkish government made earthquake insurance mandatory for 
residences starting from September 27, 2000 (Decree No.587, Compulsory 
Earthquake Insurance).  The insurance was designed by the Undersecretariat of the 
Treasury and administered by the Natural Disaster Turkish Authority (DASK in 
  9Turkish). Also, the government rescinded legislation that requires it to extend credit 
and construct buildings for the public in case of an earthquake as of March 27, 
2001.  According to TCIP that is sold by 33 authorized insurance companies, “all 
existing and future privately owned property, except for engineered rural housing 
and fully commercial buildings, is required to contribute to TCIP” (Freeman et al. 
2002). TCIP covers only a portion of the value of a residence and contents of the 
dwellings are not covered (Gulkan, 2002).  
As for the sanction power of TCIP, all new homeowners must present valid 
TCIP policy to complete ownership process. Starting 15 April 2003, a TCIP policy is 
required in order to subscribe to water and natural gas supplies in 5 cities.  
Although it was estimated that 10 out of 14 million households will be under TCIP 
coverage, until now only 2.4 million homeowners have purchased this insurance 
(Gulkan, 2002). The total commitment of TCIP through 2002 was US$26 billion. Up 
through 2002, TCIP has paid approximately 1,634,000 US dollars for claims.  
According to Gulkan (2001), there is a need for alternative mitigation 
measures as a supplement to TCIP. He notes that according to the statistics of the 
recent earthquakes, the most common type of construction in Turkey (multi-story, 
concrete frame etc.) is especially vulnerable to damage or collapse. So, he suggests 
reducing the risk to new buildings with the help of the current Turkish earthquake 
code and retrofitting existing buildings as well. That way, there will be a reduction 
not only in the property damage, but also the number of lives lost. At the same 
time, that may decrease the transaction cost of having earthquake insurance either 
from TCIP or a private insurance company.  In addition, he suggests better 
coordination between different governmental units as well as laws that emphasize 
disaster policies and mitigation.   
  All the recovery policies and mitigation measures described above may not be 
enough but they are important in a sense that they represent a concerted scientific 
  10effort to protect Turkey from future hazards.  The justification for such a concerted 
effort comes from a more complete understanding of the economic impact of the 
earthquake on Turkey in order to see how important risk management strategies 
can be for the economic recovery. The next section focuses on the statistical 
analysis of the earthquake impact on real output and employment of Turkey.  
 
IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Standard neoclassical macroeconomic theory suggests that the output of an 
economy may be described by a production function as follows: 
(1)    ) , , ( A K N f Y =
where Y denotes real output, N denotes labor, K denotes capital stock, and A 
denotes technology.  In the long run model, output is said to adhere to the notion of 
potential output.   Potential output is the amount that would be produced when the 
output, financial, money, and labor markets are in equilibrium.  For a given state of 
technology and capital stock, growing levels of employment lead to increases in 
output.  Thus, output and employment are inherently linked and represent two 
popular measures used to gauge the performance of an economy. 
In order to examine how the 1999 earthquake might have affected the 
economy, we focus the analysis on two macroeconomic indicators: the production 
index and the average number of production workers.  The monthly data are 
obtained from the State Institute of Statistics.  The sample period for the production 
index is January 1988 through July 2002.  The data on employment covers the 
period of January 1992 through July 2002.  All data are seasonally adjusted using 
the (multiplicative) ratio-to-moving average method.  In what follows we use the 
growth rates of real output and employment computed as the first-difference of the 
  11natural logarithm of the production index and the number of production workers, 
respectively. 
[insert table 2] 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the Turkish economy over the 
sample periods examined.  Note that while average output growth was positive and 
average employment growth was negative, we were unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that either mean was statistically different from zero using the t-test (t=-
0.23 with p-value=0.82 for output; t=0.93 with p-value=0.35 for employment).  Both 
series did exhibit considerable variability over their respective sample periods 
(standard deviation=0.07 for output; standard deviation=0.01 for employment).  
Figure 1 displays plots of both series.  Finally, results from unit root tests (ADF and 
KPSS) indicate that each growth rate series is stationary (see Table 2). 
[Insert figure 1] 
The time series analysis of real output and employment growth proceeds by 
specifying and estimating autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models of the 
series under investigation.  However, as the earthquake may have changed and/or 
altered the dynamics of the economy we utilize the intervention analysis described 
by Enders (2004).  The intervention analysis augments the ARMA model with a 
dummy variable that acts as an indicator of whether or not the series was 
influenced by the earthquake.  There are two types of interventions discussed by 
Enders (2004).  The first type is of the mean-shift variety in which the intervention 
variable takes on the value, zero prior to the earthquake and the value, one starting 
the month after the earthquake and every period thereafter.  This intervention 
captures a permanent or long run shift in the unconditional mean of the series.  
Thus, this intervention allows for both a short run or immediate impact and a long 
run multiplier effect.  The other type of intervention is of the pulse variety.  In this 
case the intervention variable equals one only in the month immediately following 
  12the earthquake and zero in all other months.  Provided that the ARMA model 
converges, then the pulse intervention measures the immediate impact of the 
earthquake.  Convergence of the ARMA model implies that the earthquake would 
have no long run or permanent effect on the series although significant AR (MA) 
terms indicate that the shock created by the earthquake might be felt for a number 
of months.  Equation (2) shows the ARMA-intervention model: 
(2)  () () t t t c L y L λπ ε θ φ + + = 0  
where y is the growth rate variable under investigation, c is a constant term, ε is a 
well-behaved error term, and λ is the coefficient on the intervention variable, π.  φ(L) 
and θ(L) are polynomials in the lag operator. 
In the case of the pulse type of intervention we have: 










The mean-shift intervention is given by: 








2002 1999 , 1
π
Examination of the estimated coefficient on the intervention variable in (2) 
provides information as to how and to what extent the earthquake may had an 
impact on the Turkish economy. 
Results 
The first step in the analysis was to choose the best-fitting ARMA 
specification for employment growth and for output growth.  This was accomplished 
by following standard Box-Jenkins techniques which include examination of 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions as well as comparisons of AIC 
and SBC criteria at various orders of the ARMA model (Mills, 1999).  Upon doing so, 
it was determined that output growth was best represented by an ARMA(1,0) and 
employment by a simple ARMA(0,0).  Furthermore, as there is no way to tell a priori 
  13which of the two intervention definitions is appropriate for the case at hand, we 
estimated the chosen model specifications under both definitions.  For both 
employment and output cases, the mean-shift intervention was found to be 
insignificant.  However, this was not the case for the pulse definition of the 
intervention.  Table 3 provides the results of the ARMA-intervention models based 
on the pulse definition. 
[  Insert table 3] 
Panel A of Table 3 indicates that output growth converges since the 
necessary and sufficient condition for stationarity of the AR(1) model is met, that is, 
the absolute value of the coefficient on the autoregressive term is less than one.  
The coefficient on the intervention term (earthquake) is negative and statistically 
significant.  The earthquake is estimated to have had an immediate adverse effect 
on the economy as output growth fell by 12 percent in the month following the 
event.  It is important to note that this decline in output growth is measured 
relative to what it would have been in the absence of the earthquake.  For example, 
if output had grown at a (positive) 12 percent rate that month, the observed (i.e., 
actual) growth rate would have been zero as the earthquake would have exactly 
cancelled out the positive growth.  The actual pattern of output growth in Turkey is 
highly cyclical.  This can be seen from Figure 1 as well as the negative AR(1) term.  
In fact, positive months of output growth in Turkey are typically followed by a 
month with negative growth.  Examining the actual growth rate in the months 
immediately preceding the earthquake confirms this contention.  Based on our 
analysis of the data, it is likely that output would have been positive in September 
1999 and around 12 percent had the earthquake not occurred.  Actual growth was 
near zero (-0.001). 
Panel B shows the results for the employment growth model.  It is important 
to note that the chosen ARMA specification was (0, 0) or simply a random walk 
  14model.  The coefficient on the intervention variable was found to be negative and 
significant (-0.01, p-value=0.00).  The employment growth rate thus experienced an 
immediate and long run decline following the earthquake. 
The results from the ARMA-intervention models indicate that the earthquake 
was associated with an adverse outcome for the economy.  Generally speaking, real 
output fell immediately after the earthquake before returning to its normal path 
after several months.  Employment growth fell following the earthquake; however, 
as the employment growth was best characterized, as a random walk the effect was 
permanent.  Thus, the intervention model suggests that both short run and long 
run negative effects resulted from the earthquake. 
It is interesting to speculate as to why employment growth was found to 
exhibit a long run decline while the decline of real output growth was estimated to 
be transitory.  One explanation is that the earthquake destroyed much of the 
existing capital stock and infrastructure and the rebuilding process undoubtedly 
resulted in new and improved capital stock and infrastructure.  This being the case, 
there was likely a relative shift from labor-intensive production to more technology-
driven production processes.  Consequently, the employment growth has fallen 
relative to output growth. 
V. Discussion 
This study represents an initial attempt to use real output and employment data to 
address the question, “What happened to the Turkish economy in general pre and 
post earthquake with already existing recovery policies and mitigation measures?”  
We used econometric techniques to evaluate the effect of this catastrophic 
earthquake on the time series behavior of two important macroeconomic variables:  
real output growth and employment growth, with recovery policies followed by the 
government and international donors. Our results indicate that the earthquake had 
a significant immediate negative impact on both output and employment growth in 
  15Turkey.  While output growth reverted back to its pre-disaster pattern after the 
initial shock, employment growth did not recover in spite of the policy measures in 
place to counteract this disastrous shock to the economy.  The earthquake had 
both a short run and long run influence on the Turkish economy.  Our results 
indicate that policy makers should work to identify risk management and recovery 
strategies that will help to further insulate employment growth from the adverse 
effect of a future major earthquake.   Workfare programs such as those used in Fiji 
and India may help overcome the permanent decline in employment growth and 
therefore serve as a strategy to manage the risk of reduced employment growth 
following a major earthquake.  
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Loss, in $B 
Erzincan 
(13.3.1992) 
645  8000 1450 8000 0.75 
Dinar 
(1.10.1995) 
100  6500 2043   0.25 
Adana-
Ceyhan 
150 21,000 2000  24,000 0.5 
Kocaeli 
(17.8.1999) 
>18000  320,000 26,000  600,000 >20 
Düzce 
(12.11.1999) 
812 10,100 800    1 
Source: Gülkan, 2002. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Output and Employment Growth 
 
  Output growth  Employment growth 
Mean -0.001212  0.001102 
Standard deviation  0.069931  0.013243 
ADF -19.735*  -9.997* 
KPSS 0.070  0.081 
Sample period  January 1988-July 2002  January 1992-July 2002 
Number of observations  174  126 
 
Growth rates are computed as the first-difference of natural logs of the production 
index (output) and number of production workers (employment).  ADF denotes the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic for a unit root (H0: series contains a unit 
root).  The ADF statistics are significant at the 1% level denoted by *.  KPSS denotes 
the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, Shin test statistic for a unit root (H0: series is 
stationary).  The KPSS statistics are not significant.  Tests for unit roots contained a 
constant and trend term. 
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Table 3 




Variable Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C -0.001135  0.004895  -0.231907  0.8169 
Output growth(t-1)  -0.398412  0.071447  -5.576292  0.0000 
Earthquake -0.124577  0.006320  -19.71003  0.0000 
R-squared 0.171886    




Variable Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C 0.001113  0.001191  0.934508  0.3519 
Employment growth(t-1)  0.098039  0.121384  0.807678  0.4208 
Earthquake -0.008790  0.001531  -5.741658  0.0000 
R-squared 0.013834    
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Figure 1 



















Vertical line designates the August 1999 earthquake. 
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